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When Do Groups Get It Right? – On the Epistemic 
Performance of Voting and Deliberation 
Simon Scheller ∗ 
Abstract: »Wann treffen Gruppen richtige Entscheidungen? Über die epistemi-
sche Leistungsfähigkeit von Wahl- und Deliberationsverfahren«. This paper ex-
amines the claim that democratic decision making is epistemically valuable. Fo-
cussing on communication and voting, circumstances are identified under 
which groups are able to reliably identify the ‘correct alternative.’ Employing 
formal models from social epistemology, group performance under varying 
conditions in a simple epistemic task is scrutinized. Simulation results show 
that larger majority requirements can favour the veto power of closed-minded 
individuals, but can also increase precision in well-functioning groups. Reason-
able scepticism against other people's opinions can provide a useful impedi-
ment to overly quick convergence onto a false consensus when independent 
information acquisition is possible. 
Keywords: Deliberation, voting, agent-based modeling, group decision making, 
bounded confidence, social epistemology. 
1.  Introduction  
Group decisions are a central element of social interaction. Be it in political 
assemblies, company boards, or informal groups: A large number of decisions 
are not taken by single individuals, but by groups. It is thereby often claimed 
that such group decisions should be made democratically, which is mostly 
justified on the basis of two distinct arguments. The first argument concerns the 
fairness of democratic procedures: Democratic voting is claimed to be the only 
way to aggregate individual preferences fairly, since it gives equal weight to 
individual preferences. However, following Arrow (2012), social choice theory 
has extensively examined this claim and by and large found that all possible 
voting rules have substantial inherent flaws (see e.g. Riker 1982). 
The second argument (which is also at the focus of this paper) concerns the 
epistemic quality of democratic decisions. Going back to Rousseau’s idea of 
the ‘general will’ (Rousseau 1964) and following Habermas’s deliberative ideal 
(Habermas 1996), deliberative democrats have frequently claimed that demo-
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cratic decision making results in ‘better’ decisions: “The decision of majorities 
about which policies to pursue can provide good evidence about which policies 
are in fact best” (Cohen 1986, 34) – given that public deliberation is guided by 
the right principles. 
There are two ways of substantiating this claim. On the one hand, delibera-
tion facilitates the transmission of information: Individuals can improve their 
knowledge of an issue by talking to each other which, in turn, improves the 
group’s decision (Elster 1998, 11). On the other hand, the epistemic value of 
democracy can be located in voting: As Condorcet’s jury theorem illustrates, 
larger groups perform better under majority rule – as long as individual 
knowledge is sufficiently independent and individuals have a better than ran-
dom-chance of being correct (de Condorcet 1785). Yet, both arguments are not 
without criticism. Effective information transmission is hindered by a variety 
of psychological biases, cascading phenomena, or polarization. For Condor-
cet’s jury theorem, the assumption of independence is usually not fulfilled, 
which renders the theorem broadly without real application. 
The goal of this paper is to scrutinize those arguments by means of an agent-
based model, in which a group of agents faces the simple, epistemic task of 
making a choice from a set of discrete options. The stylized process of demo-
cratic decision making incorporates communication under bounded confidence 
(Hegselmann and Krause 2002), and voting in the form of majority voting with 
varying majority thresholds. In an additional model version, agents can also 
acquire new evidence as an alternative to communication. 
Insightful results are obtained: First, while large majority requirements may 
increase the chances of correct decisions when communication is functioning, 
it also increases the chances of gridlock when people are closed-minded about 
an issue. Second, when external sources of information are available, a certain 
degree of scepticism against other people’s views impedes overly quick con-
vergence onto a false consensus and can therefore improve the group’s epis-
temic performance. This corroborates findings by Zollman (2010). On a meth-
odological dimension, the paper makes a contribution by introducing models 
from social epistemology to the context of democratic decision making. Over-
all, the model supports advocating a multidimensional view on democracy, 
showing how deliberation and voting can be combined efficiently. 
To lay out all those points, I contextualize the project by outlining the rele-
vant theories and literature in Section 2, summarizing the main arguments from 
democratic theory, previous theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of 
democratic mechanisms, as well as formal models from social epistemology. 
Section 3 describes the basic model of democratic decision making as commu-
nication and voting. In a modified version of the model (Section 4), agents also 
have the alternative of acquiring independent information. Section 5 concludes 
by showing how these findings can lead to an augmented understanding of 
democratic decision making institutions, and how they support the epistemic 
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democrat’s claim that democratic procedures result in epistemically superior 
outcomes. 
2. Theory and Literature 
2.1  The Epistemic Value of Democracy 
Talking about the epistemic quality of group decisions presupposes the exist-
ence of some sort of ‘objective truth.’ As List and Goodin argue,  
[t]he hallmark of the epistemic approach, in all its forms, is its fundamental 
premise that there exists some procedure-independent fact of the matter as to 
what the best or right outcome is. (List and Goodin 2001, 4) 
While this supposition is frequently discussed, I continue under the assumption 
that matters with an objective truth exist, as do others, for which this is not the 
case. Duggan and Martinelli (2001, 260) provide illustrative cases for such 
truth-issues: a jury deciding about the guilt or innocence of a defendant, or a 
group of doctors deciding about the best treatment for a patient. In both exam-
ples, it is clear that all participants share a common goal, and they discuss the 
best way of achieving said goal. Thus, the arguments of this paper apply to 
problems that can be reasonably seen as epistemic problems; and there exist 
enough relevant problems of this sort to render this discussion relevant. 
According to Estlund (2009), epistemic quality of decisions must necessari-
ly be guaranteed in order to legitimize democratic procedures, which is why it 
is essential to establish the epistemic potency of groups. In political philosophy 
however, discussions regarding the merits of democratic decisions is often 
solely a normative endeavour, which is, for example, expressed by List and 
Goodin: “[a] pure epistemic approach tells us that our social decision rules 
ought be chosen so as to track [the] truth” (List and Goodin 2001, 4, my em-
phasis). 
Regarding deliberation, a range of scholars have provided criteria for opti-
mal deliberative procedures: Habermas’s ideal speech situation (Habermas 
1996), Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 2009), or also Estlund’s “imaginary 
model epistemic deliberation” (Estlund 2009, 175). While these approaches 
somewhat differ in primary focus and intention, they all prescribe an ideal 
deliberative procedure that produces desired outcomes if correctly employed. 
The same is true for claims regarding the epistemic quality of voting. Con-
dorcet’s jury theorem (de Condorcet 1785) provides the key argument: Groups 
are more likely to make correct decisions under majority rule when the group 
becomes larger – assuming that individuals are more likely to be right than 
wrong, and that their individual judgments are probabilistically independent 
from each other (see e.g. Estlund 2009, 15 for a more detailed description and 
discussion). However, the theorem is largely dependent upon the fact that the 
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assumptions which it requires are actually fulfilled in a certain situation. If, for 
example, individual guesses are not independent, the theorem does not say 
anything about the truth-tracking merits of majority voting. 
On that basis, the rest of this paper scrutinizes deliberation as a tool of in-
formation transmission among groups, and voting as a way to aggregate infor-
mation independently – with regards to their potential to reach better decisions. 
Doubtlessly, both procedures exhibit a large array of other merits. The work by 
Elster (1998) constitutes a good starting point for a more extensive overview. 
However, for the sake of conceptual focus, this stylized description of demo-
cratic procedures and the epistemic democrat’s claim will constitute the basis 
of discussion for this paper. 
At the same time, there are various alternative ways of exchanging infor-
mation apart from direct communication. One crucial advantage of exchanging 
information directly via group communication, however, is that it combines an 
efficient way of connecting multiple actors as sources and receivers of messag-
es simultaneously. Thus, having a public deliberative forum1 facilitates the 
exchange of information in a uniquely efficient way. Apart from its efficiency, 
a public deliberative forum also provides the immediate opportunity of being 
subject to a potentially balanced input from all actors. These points motivate 
the special interest in this form of democratic information exchange. 
2.2  Pitfalls and Problems of Deliberative Democracy 
In contrast to these optimistic claims about the merits of democratic decision 
making, there is also a list of problems and pitfalls of deliberation and voting. 
Being aware of those is a necessary prerequisite to appropriately model demo-
cratic procedures on the basis of empirical findings. The following list gives a 
brief overview of some major issues with group processes. 
- The persuasion bias: When group members exchange opinions,2 what 
weight should one give to other people’s opinions, given that information 
is transferred between multiple individuals along complex channels. Cer-
tain pieces of information may therefore receive disproportional attention 
(Golub and Jackson 2010, 2). As a result, a person’s position in a social 
network – and not just the quality of her information – determines her in-
fluence on the group’s aggregate beliefs (DeMarzo et al. 2003). 
- The common knowledge effect: Information that is available to a large 
number of people is more likely to be accepted, discussed, and empha-
                                                             
1  In this context, this does not necessarily have to be in the form of public, personal group 
deliberation, but can also amount to other forms of exchange. 
2  The terms ’opinion’ and ‘beliefs’ are used interchangeably in the context of this paper since 
it is explicitly stated that only epistemic matters are addressed here – and purely preferen-
tial questions are not, even if some of the described models are usually situated in preferen-
tial settings. 
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sized than less commonly available information (Gigone and Hastie 
1993). This potentially leads to a homogenization of opinions, while un-
common opinions are more likely to be dismissed. 
- The social comparison effect: People desire to be accepted and liked by 
other individuals in a social group, which some aim to achieve by taking 
similar opinions to one’s peers. Similar to the previous heuristics, social 
comparison usually results in opinion convergence (Sunstein 2002, 179). 
- Homophily: People tend to associate more often with people who are like 
themselves: Two people of the same ethnic background are more likely 
to get married; Republicans are more likely to exchange opinions with 
Republicans as opposed to Democrats. Overall, social groups homoge-
nize (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). This may have a strong impact on the 
information one receives (McPherson et al. 2001) and even trigger a self-
reinforcing process where people take their opinion itself as a selector for 
communication partners, and thus self-affirming their own positions. 
- The persuasive argument effect: Due to her limited capacities, an indi-
vidual’s opinion is based on only a fraction of all available arguments. 
Since people holding similar sets of arguments can be expected to group 
around certain positions on the opinion spectrum (homophily), people 
will frequently be subject to arguments that are supportive of their cur-
rent position, and much less to arguments that would run counter to their 
overall view. Hence, selective availability of information from like-
minded people produces a confirmatory bias that makes people overcon-
fident in their own opinion (Sunstein 2002, 179). 
The described effects constitute a serious threat to the potential merits of delib-
eration: Contrary to what the arguments by theorists of deliberative democracy 
suggest, irrational biases and rationally justifiable pitfalls can hinder the effi-
cient aggregation of information. Especially opinion polarization can severely 
undermine the finding of a rational consensus. One undermining factor is the 
occurrence of “enclave deliberation” (Sunstein 2006, 186): Within homogene-
ous, isolated subgroups of people commonly held persuasive arguments in-
crease the members’ convictions. Between groups, less interaction takes place. 
This further polarizes opinions and also the information and arguments people 
hold and thereby hinders the efficient use of information for group decisions. 
Central for the later model description, the essence of the described effects 
and biases is captured by the bounded confidence model (Hegselmann and 
Krause 2002, 2006). Their formal model of opinion dynamics is also able to 
reproduce the described effects of polarization and fragmentation of opinions in 
groups and requires only very sparse assumptions to do so. 
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2.3  Literature Review 
Looking at the overall picture, positive claims about deliberation and voting are 
contrasted with serious shortfalls and problems. Assessing the functionality of 
these tools as democratic mechanisms, scholars have employed formal models 
and empirical analyses. Economists have studied the interplay between com-
munication and voting, yet with a focus on problems of preference aggregation 
and information revelation, and hence not for purely epistemic problems (see 
e.g. Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Doraszelski et al. 2003). Gerardi and 
Yariv (2007), studying an epistemic group decision problem, find that pre-
voting deliberation renders a large class of voting rules equivalent, as long as 
they are veto-free. While those game theoretic models are able to identify equi-
libria for a variety of conditions, they capture interaction as a strategic process 
between fully rational actors. Realising the empirical inadequacy of this suppo-
sition, the model in this paper departs from the assumption of perfect rationality. 
Goeree and Yariv (2011) find experimental evidence that most voting rules 
are rendered equivalent when communication takes place. They observe that 
deliberation uniformly improves efficiency and also diminishes the impact of 
institutional rules significantly. Interestingly, Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) find 
evidence for strategic voting under unanimity rule. More generally, empirical 
evidence on the presence and impact of deliberation is difficult to collect as 
strategic communication (bargaining) and non-strategic communication (argu-
ing) are in practice hard to distinguish, specifically since they usually occur 
together (Bächtiger and Wyss 2013, 159). In their survey on empirical delibera-
tion studies, Bächtiger and Wyss (2013) identify a variety of contributions that 
aim at measuring the occurrence of deliberative behaviour. Yet, when looking 
for effects of deliberation on the epistemic quality of outcomes in group delib-
eration, the authors report a general lack of studies (Bächtiger and Wyss 2013, 
175). Similarly, Bozbay et al. (2014) report a lack of theoretical works on epis-
temic problems:  
So far, however, [… the literature] has paid only little attention to a different 
‘epistemic’ approach of aiming to track the truth, i.e., reach true group judg-
ments. The theory does not model the private information underlying voters’ 
judgments, thereby preventing itself from studying questions of efficient in-
formation aggregation. Yet such an epistemic perspective seems particularly 
natural in the context of aggregating judgments (rather than preferences). 
(Bozbay et al. 2014, 2) 
As this short (and far from all-encompassing) literature review suggests, a large 
potential exists for studies on judgment aggregation and truth-tracking in the 
context of democratic theory. Interestingly enough, such epistemic questions 
have been taken up by philosophers under the label of ‘social epistemology’: 
Scholars of this field envisage science as a process of social knowledge crea-
tion, circling around the question of “whether we ought to let our opinions be 
guided, even if only partly, by those of others” (Douven and Riegler 2009, 
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326). This question is equally central for considerations in the context of dem-
ocratic theory. 
Scholars of social epistemology frequently employ formal models to study 
truth-tracking capacities of different network structures, information exchange 
procedures or group constellations. Those formal, often agent-based simulation 
models have the advantage of providing tools to study concrete procedures and 
mechanisms in a stylized fashion. When it comes to evaluating democratic 
procedures, previous literature on democratic theory can merely hope for the 
merits of deliberation to overcome the shortfalls of social influence. Formal 
models, in contrast, can help to actually identify circumstances under which 
groups function well in epistemic tasks, and how certain arguments counterbal-
ance each other. 
Muldoon (2013) summarizes the main streams in the literature on social 
epistemology, of which some will be briefly touched upon here. Weisberg and 
Muldoon (2009) model science’s search for truth as a search for the “highest 
points” on an “epistemic landscape.” Scientists can explore unknown territory 
or follow others in order to reach states of ‘higher’ knowledge, while they are 
driven by a self-interest to be credited for good results. This choice between 
exploring or following could be translated into a choice between researching or 
communicating, which informs the extended model in this paper (Section 4). 
Others have focused on the role and emergence of consensus in science and 
society. A baseline model of consensus formation has been presented by Lehrer 
and Wagner (1981). Although not initially intended as such, their model was 
later interpreted as depicting communication among scientists as an iterated, 
weighted updating procedure of individual opinions. Each individual takes into 
account every other individual’s opinion with a certain non-zero weight. Simul-
taneous and repeated updating can be shown to result in convergence to con-
sensus. French (1956) and DeGroot (1974) describe similar dynamic models. 
Zollman (2010) introduces network structures for modelling communication 
in scientific communities, where agents update their beliefs in a Bayesian fash-
ion. Surprisingly, he finds that fewer connections between agents can be bene-
ficial for reaching the correct solution as this prevents overly quick conver-
gence onto a potentially false consensus, which in turn allows for broader 
diversity in exploring alternative possibilities. 
Hegselmann and Krause (2002) describe a model of opinion dynamics, in 
which agents communicate by averaging their opinion and those of others. 
However, they average only with those others that have sufficiently similar 
opinions than themselves. The psychological effects from above provide an 
empirical foundation for the model formalization that was chosen: The fact that 
people only talk to like-minded others can be seen as a clear instance of homo-
philious behaviour or resulting from social comparison. As information is 
exchanged more frequently among like-minded people, they will be subject to 
the common knowledge effect, the persuasion bias, and the persuasive argu-
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ment effect alike. Further, agents update opinions by simple myopic averaging 
over all opinions they consider. Thus, modelling behaviour in this way incorpo-
rates the empirically found biases from above, especially when it comes to the 
agent’s limited processing capacities and the described affective, non-rational 
behavioural patterns. 
In a model extension, some agents are “attracted” by the true value of the 
parameter they seek to identify, while regular agents still solely “follow” others 
in their opinion (Hegselmann and Krause 2006). Notably, a relatively small 
number of truth-seekers is sufficient for the convergence of the group onto the 
correct consensus. A feature similar to this extension will also be part of the 
second model version to be presented below. 
While those models have been employed for answering questions about 
convergence on true scientific knowledge in society, my goal in this paper is to 
apply such model structures to questions of democratic theory and of group 
decision making. This lays the ground for studying the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of different decision making rules and communication schemes in 
producing correct outcomes. 
3.  The Baseline Model 
3.1  Model Description 
The model at hand is based on a simplistic epistemic problem: A group of 
agents faces a choice between four options A, B, C, and D. These options are 
graphically represented by the four quadrants of a coordinate system. Further, 
an optimal point O exists with the coordinates (xo, yo), which lies in one of the 
four quadrants. The task of the group is to find out in which of the quadrants 
the optimal point lies. 
Each agent receives an independent signal for the coordinates of O. The sig-
nal for the x-coordinate is given by a random draw from the uniform distribu-
tion from the interval [xo – 50; xo + 50]. Analogously, the signal for the y-
coordinate is given by a random draw from the uniform distribution from the 
interval [yo – 50; yo + 50]. Thus, a position on the two-dimensional plain with 
the four quadrants can be ascribed to each agent, enabling a neat graphical 
representation of the epistemic problem. The agent’s position thereby repre-
sents her best guess for the true value of O. 
For the subsequent simulations, the optimal point is fixed at (3, 3) in order 
to keep the epistemic problem’s difficulty and each individual’s primary 
chance of making a correct judgment constant. The model screenshot in Figure 
1 depicts an exemplary random distribution of 100 agents on the opinion space. 
The optimal point O at (3, 3) is marked by the grey square in the bottom left 
corner of the top right quadrant A. 
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Figure 1: Graphic Illustration of the Underlying Epistemic Problem 
 
 
An intuitive interpretation of such a problem would be a choice between poli-
cies, the utility of which is determined by two separate utility dimensions with 
linearly decreasing marginal utility. For example, imagine a city council that 
needs to evaluate different project proposals for a railway extension with re-
gards to the dimensions cost and environmental impact, and needs to choose 
one of those discrete options. Each option must be evaluated regarding both 
dimensions, and the people need to judge what combination provides an opti-
mal solution. 
At the beginning of each round, all agents take a vote on the four discrete 
options. Each agent votes for the option she considers best, i.e. the quadrant she 
is located in. An agent’s position, in turn, is based on all the signals she has 
previously had access to, and agents are assumed to vote solely based on that 
opinion without any strategic or other considerations.3 As soon as one of the 
options reaches the necessary quorum of votes, this option is considered the 
group’s choice.4 
If no qualified majority is found in a vote, agents have the possibility to 
communicate. They do this by “proclaiming” their current position to all other 
agents. However, communication works under a setting of bounded confidence 
(Hegselmann and Krause 2002): Agents listen only to other agents which have 
beliefs that are similar enough to their own beliefs. More specifically, an agent 
listens to another agent if the distance between them is smaller than ε. Techni-
                                                             
3  Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) challenge the assumption that each agent simply votes for 
her preferred option as irrational under certain circumstances. This shall, however, be of no 
further concern in this paper, and a myopic and heuristic-based decision behaviour is pre-
scribed for the agents, as for instance in Zollman (2010, 2013), and most importantly be-
cause it is considered the more realistic behavioural assumption for epistemic questions. 
4  If more than two options reach the quorum at the same time (which is only possible if no 
absolute majority is required), the option with most votes is chosen. If two or more quorum-
reaching alternatives tie, the winner is picked randomly between these options. These spe-
cial cases are very rare and have no impact on the model analysis. 
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cally, the parameter ε describes a circle-shaped area with radius ε around an 
agent’s position. All agents within this area are considered for opinion updat-
ing, all agents outside of this circle are ignored. A small ε-value therefore 
means that an agent listens only to others with very similar opinions, while a 
large ε describes an agent that is much more open for contrasting or contradic-
tory information. 
Updating occurs by simple averaging over all considered agents, including 
the agent itself. All communication and updating happens simultaneously. Each 
communication round is followed by another vote. This iterated process con-
tinues until the majority threshold is reached, or is terminated if no more com-
munication occurs, i.e. if agents either have the identical positions or do not 
listen to each other. Failure to reach the necessary quorum when communica-
tion breaks down is counted as an incorrect decision. As soon as a decision is 
made, new random initial signals are allocated and the process starts anew. 
Thus, all individual decisions are independent from each other. This completes 
the description of the baseline model. 
3.2  Results 
This first analysis incorporates two parameters which supposedly influence the 
epistemic performance of groups. These are the quorum, i.e. the majority 
threshold that is required for a decision to be made, and ε, which describes how 
open individual agents are for divergent opinions. These parameters constitute 
the independent variables of the experiment. For each parameter constellation, 
1,000 individual decision problems were simulated, each decision problem 
with a randomly assigned distribution of initial signals. As argued, the optimal 
point O remains the same for all problems in order to guarantee comparability. 
Epistemic group performance is measured by the probability of making a 
correct decision (i.e. to choose option A) under a given parametrisation, la-
belled correctness. To evaluate efficiency of the procedures, the variable time 
measures the average number of communication rounds until a decision is 
made – regardless of whether the decision is right or wrong. Correctness and 
time constitute the dependent variables of the experiment. The interest of the 
analysis therefore lies on how ε and the quorum influence correctness and time. 
In Figure 2, the quorum is depicted on the x-axis; ε is located on the y-axis. 
Correctness is displayed in the resulting grid and illustrated by color-coding. 
Figure 2 shows results for a group of 50 agents.5 
                                                             
5  In a series of robustness checks, increasing the number of agents significantly increased 
correctness, and decreased correctness for smaller groups. This corroborates classic jury-
theorem findings, since more agents offer a larger pool of information, individual errors are 
more likely to cancel out, and thus more people increase the likelihood of a correct group 
decision. For the analysis of this paper, detailed results regarding the impact of group size 
were omitted for the sake of focus and simplicity. 
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Figure 2: Correctness Results in the Baseline Model 
 
 
The most striking feature of Figure 2 is twofold: First, no correct decisions are 
reached for small ε and a large enough quorum (bottom right corner). As it 
turns out, this stems from failures to reach a decision (see Figure 3): For small 
ε, it is very likely that agents do not communicate with each other since they 
are outside each other’s confidence bounds. Thus, if the necessary quorum is 
not reached already at the outset, the lack of communication prevents the for-
mation of the necessary majority. The larger the required majority, the more 
likely this scenario becomes. 
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Figure 3: Failure Results in the Baseline Model 
 
 
Second, apart from the parameter area where the group fails to make a deci-
sion, ε appears to have a slight positive effect on correctness. Unbiased com-
munication, in this scenario, seems to be at least not worse than being sceptical 
against alternative opinions.  
The impact of quorum-size is similarly small, yet a clear and strong positive 
impact occurs when the quorum is increased from 30% to 35%. Here, the quor-
um enables communication to happen in the first place, since for a 30%-
threshold, a decision is usually already found in the very first vote and hence 
without any communication taking place. A large enough quorum thus forces 
people to communicate. Yet, this can work only if people are also willing to 
communicate (e.g., if ε is large enough). For small ε-values, the larger quorum 
causes failure to reach a majority. Even larger quora do not seem to make any 
further difference for correctness, and only increase the chances of gridlock. 
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Figure 4: Time Results in the Baseline Model 
 
 
Decisions are found very quickly for large and very small ε-values (see Figure 
4): For large ε, discussion is very efficient and does not take much time. For 
very small ε, no communication occurs anyway. Thus, either a decision is 
found relatively quickly – or not at all. Only for intermediate values of ε, deci-
sions take up to 11 communication rounds. This behaviour stems from the 
basic mechanics of bounded-confidence updating process: Opinion conver-
gence is slowest when ε-intervals are large enough to connect some agents, yet 
small enough not to connect too many agents at the same time. Then, as also 
described by Hegselmann and Krause (2002), opinions converge over multiple 
steps. The more they converge, the more likely it becomes that the necessary 
quorum is reached, and, of course, the larger the quorum, the more conver-
gence is required. 
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Unfortunately, longer discussions do not promote better decisions in this 
model. For those intermediate ε-parametrizations, no decision is reached even 
after this longer time. The intermediate values of ε lead to polarization between 
only a few points of attraction, which explains why communication takes long-
er. It also explains why there is no success eventually: When a small number of 
clusters forms, one of them needs to be much larger than the rest so as to attract 
enough agents for the quorum to be reached. The larger the quorum, the less 
likely this becomes. Thus, looking at the interplay of time and correctness 
implies that there is not really a trade-off between quicker yet less precise or 
slower yet more precise decision mechanisms in this version of the model. This 
is due to the specific dynamics of the bounded confidence process, which either 
leads to culmination in one point rather quickly – or not at all. Interestingly, 
this replicates findings by Golub and Jackson (2010). Their model is based on 
network structures that are subject to naive opinion updating on the basis of 
DeGroot (1974). The authors equally report that the time of convergence and 
whether or not the group converges onto the correct solution are usually inde-
pendent. 
4.  The Research-Talk Model 
4.1  Model Description and Background 
In the baseline model, agents change their views only through communication. 
As has become obvious in the analysis, the time dimension could not be rea-
sonably interpreted. One major reason for this is that communication has no 
opportunity cost, since time cannot be spent any other way. This is clearly not a 
realistic depiction of decision making in reality. A logical alternative choice of 
action is suggested once again by the theory of social epistemology, which 
models the scientific process as communication and individual information 
acquisition by independent research (see e.g. Hegselmann and Krause 2006; 
Weisberg and Muldoon 2009; Zollman 2010). The idea translates easily to the 
context of democratic decision making: Alternative to receiving information 
from others, people also have the possibility to collect information inde-
pendently. This setting allows comparing whether time should be better spent 
researching or communicating. In practice, independent information acquisition 
can refer to collecting data, visiting the location of an infrastructure project, or 
simply researching a subject on the internet or by other sources. For the formal 
model, it is deliberately left open what specific actions ‘researching’ adheres to. 
Formally, whether an agent communicates or researches is decided probabil-
istically before each round. The probability that the agent chooses to research is 
given by the parameter pr, which is externally set and equal for each agent. If, 
for example, pr = 0.3, an agent will choose the option research with a probability 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  103 
of 30%, and communicate with a probability of 70%. If pr = 0, all agents will 
communicate all the time, which is equivalent to the baseline model. If pr = 1, 
all agents will perform research all the time and never communicate. The ran-
dom choices of individual agents are independent from each other. 
When an agent researches, the distance between her current ‘best guess’ and 
the true optimal point O is reduced by one percent.6 In other words, researching 
moves the agent’s position one percent closer to the true value. This is in close 
analogy to Hegselmann and Krause (2006), who capture researching by the 
parameter α. 
The communication process itself remains unchanged. However, note that 
researching agents are excluded from the communication process for the round 
in which they perform research. Other agents do not receive signals about their 
positions and can, hence, not be considered by communicating agents.7 
Further, a new criterion for decision-failure must be provided, since infinite 
researching would potentially stretch the decision process tremendously. This 
not only exhausts computational resources quickly, but is also unrealistic in the 
context of democratic decision making: After a certain time, groups can be 
expected to terminate a decision process when no agreement is found. A simi-
lar argument for process termination is employed by Zollman (2010, 31). I 
choose 500 rounds as the limit after which a decision process counts as failed.8 
4.2  Results 
Figures 5 and 6 display results for the extended model in the same way as 
before: The x-axis displays the quorum, the y-axis ε. To study the impact of the 
new parameter pr, a series of these plots for various values of pr is presented. 
For the analysis, I focus on the most interesting similarities and differences to 
the reference model without research. 
For small probabilities of research and high enough quora, the parameter ar-
ea where the group fails to find agreement remains. However, failure can be 
                                                             
6  Robustness checks have shown that manipulating this one-percent value changes merely 
the relative strength of certain effects and for what parameter regions they occur, but it 
does not qualitatively alter any of the core results. 
7  A similar probabilistic setup was proposed by Douven and Riegler (2009) as an extension to 
the bounded-confidence model. Here, the model diverges from the specification by Hegsel-
mann and Krause (2006), in which agents take a weighted average between researched and 
communicated information. Arguably, it is more realistic when an agent has to pick how to 
spend her time and therefore makes a choice between two discrete options. This may poten-
tially also have interesting effects on the outcome since certain agents are temporarily ex-
cluded from the communication process. 
8  The impact of the decision time limit plays a major role for the results, and has been exten-
sively analysed as part of the robustness analysis. While severe quantitative shifts in the re-
sults do occur, the quality of the results remains the same as long as they are not overruled 
by predictable effects of a significantly shorter or longer time limit. 
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eliminated by increasing pr, as shown in Figure 5: Already for pr = 0.6, grid-
lock hardly occurs. This, however, comes with a cost: As Figure 6 shows, time 
strongly increases with larger pr and when ε is small. Had the maximum deci-
sion-time been lower, failures would occur more often. 
Thus, a high research probability is beneficial if ε is small – a result that 
makes intuitive sense: Collecting one’s own evidence is superior when com-
munication does not work. Put the other way round: When ε is too small for 
agents to be connected, individual research can help to bridge the gap. 
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Figure 6: Decision-Time in the Research-Talk Model for pr = 40 
 
The simulation also shows that the group performs better for moderate ε-values 
compared to both small and large values of ε if only some research is possible 
(pr < 0.4). How is this possible? I argue that this replicates findings by Zollman 
(2010) that less densely connected epistemic communities exhibit a better 
performance since they do not converge onto a ‘false consensus’ too quickly 
but give the group enough time to gather independent information. For larger ε, 
a rash decision would be made before agents had enough time to carry out 
sufficient independent research. For smaller ε, time becomes a strong determi-
nant factor, in some cases leading to failure to find agreement, and generally 
rendering the process much less efficient. Too much independent research also 
slows down the process indirectly: Since fewer agents enter the communication 
arena, and the larger gaps between fewer agents reduces the amount of com-
munication that takes place in a given round. In conclusion, a reasonable de-
gree of scepticism against socially gathered information impedes herding ef-
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fects and information cascades, while still being able to benefit from other 
people’s input. 
While the previous considerations are mostly applicable to large quora, 
more research is a feasible tool for smaller majority requirements. For example, 
pure research already performs really well when a 40% threshold is required. A 
focus on communication is therefore more efficient if large quora must be met. 
For lower requirements, more researching can result in a better performance.  
In summary, the extended model enables studying the trade-off between cor-
rectness and time systematically and implies the following conclusions: Well-
functioning and unbiased communication provides an efficient epistemic tool. 
Yet, it can be prone to convergence onto a false consensus if too little inde-
pendent information is fed into the process. Independent researching, in con-
trast, makes the epistemic process more precise at the cost of slowing down the 
decision making process. Stricter majority requirements can make a process 
more reliable, but also slower and more failure-prone. When a large threshold-
level is externally given, communication provides an efficient means for meet-
ing such a demanding requirement. In a larger context, these findings justify a 
perspective on democracy that argues for a multi-faceted view on democratic 
procedures: While combining the beneficial effects of voting and deliberation 
as described by the Condorcet jury theorem and deliberative democrats is gen-
erally possible, the model analysis illustrates that voting and talking cannot be 
combined arbitrarily.  
5.  Conclusion 
Deliberation and voting play a central role in arguing for the epistemic quality 
of democratic decision making processes. Yet, empirical findings suggest 
broad potential for various pitfalls in the processes. The described agent-based 
model provides a vehicle that allows for a more balanced view on the merits 
and problems of voting and deliberation, and to disentangle interaction effect 
between the two. This paper thereby provides a multi-faceted perspective on 
democratic decision making, combining seminal works from political philoso-
phy, psychology, and social epistemology. 
By studying the interplay between voting rules and communication struc-
tures, insightful perspectives on democratic decision making are obtained. 
Consider for instance the impact of majority requirements: Unanimity is often 
argued for on the basis that nobody’s opinion can be overruled. This might 
grant it the attribute of inclusiveness. Quite to the contrary, the model analysis 
highlights that large majority requirements lend strong veto powers to closed-
minded individuals with extreme views. As long as people are open to com-
municating with each other, large quora can augment a group’s epistemic ca-
pacities. However, if people’s opinions polarize as a result of a lack of open-
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  107 
ness, strict majority requirements can also lead to gridlock and standstill by 
granting a veto power to closed-minded people. 
Does this mean that scepticism against other opinions is generally bad? As 
has been shown, moderate openness to communication can be superior to too 
much or too little openness by preventing the group from converging onto a 
false consensus too quickly. A balanced mix between independent information 
collection and dissemination can thus impede the occurrence of group think 
phenomena, information cascades, and other herding tendencies. This corrobo-
rates findings by Zollman (2010), who finds similar results with regards to less 
densely connected communication networks. For this to work, however, relia-
ble external sources of information must be available. 
Taking such insights into account when choosing problem specific decision 
making rules makes for better institutional designs. This paper’s analysis can 
thus inform structural decisions in politics and elsewhere. Additionally, such 
models can provide conceptual understanding for real world phenomena, such 
as the functioning or failure of expert groups, political committees, or other 
decision making bodies. 
From a methodological perspective, the model illustrates how agent-based 
simulations can contribute structure and substance to arguments that are hard to 
underpin empirically. Certainly, no purely theoretical model can appropriately 
substitute empirical data, and the model’s high degree of abstraction implies 
that applications to real world cases cannot be made easily. Yet, when there is 
no well-founded basis on which to make a claim (in the present case: the epis-
temic quality of group decisions), it is better to make an argument on the basis 
of a clearly outlined, hypothetical scenario that captures a broad range of pos-
sibilities, rather than to make a claim on no basis at all. At the same time, there 
is an independent quality in identifying and understanding the causal structures 
underlying a certain process. In an abstract model, central causal effects can be 
focussed on while ignoring ‘empirical noise.’ Analysing such a model can help 
to highlight certain causal mechanisms and how they influence outcomes in a 
sense of studying the fundamental building blocks in a complexly interacting 
system. In doing so, potential causal explanations for certain real world phe-
nomena can be presented. 
In a larger framework, this paper also feeds into a justification of democratic 
decision making for epistemic groups. By employing formal models from 
social epistemology, it is shown that communication and voting structures can 
produce epistemically superior outcomes. Cohen’s initially quoted suggestion 
that “the decision of majorities about which policies to pursue can provide 
good evidence about which policies are in fact best” (Cohen 1986, 34) can 
therefore not only be confirmed, it can also be made concrete and substantiated 
by the model. The findings from the model go beyond the classic jury-theorem-
results by also considering the impact of communication style (especially 
openness for other opinions) and different decision rules. Additionally, time is 
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introduced as a dimension of analysis. This allows for the evaluation of ques-
tions regarding the efficiency of decision making schemes. Thus, one can not 
only say how groups can get it right, but also what an efficient decisions proce-
dure for a certain group should look like, and how certain pitfalls can be over-
come. 
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